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The New Red River Rivalry: Oklahoma’s Unconstitutional 
Attempt to Calm the Waters by Restricting the Sale of 
Water Across State Lines 
 
I. Introduction 
In recent years, the need for water has taken an increasingly important 
role in states’ quests to meet the expanding drinking, industrial, 
agricultural, and recreational needs of their citizens, especially in drought-
prone areas of the country such as north Texas.1 To resolve both current and 
future water shortage concerns, many states have entered into 
congressionally approved water compacts to apportion certain water 
resources between neighboring states. However, cities and municipalities, 
such as Irving, Texas, are still in dire need of water to meet their 
burgeoning projected population growth and are forced to seek additional 
supply from areas with excess water supply.2 This has resulted in a large-
scale competition between various municipalities to acquire any and “all 
available water rights within a cost-effective distance.”3 But states are 
beginning to fight back against their municipalities, and many are resorting 
to controversial and often discriminatory tactics to protect their precious 
water resources from being taken by, or even sold to, municipalities in 
thirsty neighboring states. 
                                                                                                                 
 1. E.g., J. Mark McPherson, Why Is Texas So Hot for Oklahoma Water? Because the 
Metroplex Is at the Water’s Edge: Let the Wars Begin (article presented at Okla. Water 
Env’t Ass’n, Am. Pub. Works Ass’n-Okla. Chapter Annual Meeting, Norman, Okla., Apr. 6-
8, 2009), available at http://www.texash2olaw.com/pdfs/Texas%20v%20OK%20for%20 
Water.pdf. 
 2. See City of Irving, Texas’s First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & 
Injunctive Relief at 2, City of Hugo v. Nichols, No. CIV-08-303-JTM, 2010 WL 1816345 
(E.D. Okla. June 2, 2009), 2009 WL 2860901, vacated, 656 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011). 
Based on 2008 data, the City of Irving had a residential population of 210,150; the 
population is expected to reach 298,000 by the year 2100. Id. As a result, Irving’s water 
demand is expected to increase from its current usage of approximately forty-three million 
gallons per day to over eighty million gallons per day by 2100. Id. However, Irving currently 
only has a reliable water supply of forty-six million gallons per day. Id. 
 3. Nicholas Andrew, Note, Interstate Water Transfers and the Red River Shootout, 41 
TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 181, 181 (2011). 
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In City of Hugo v. Nichols, the City of Irving, Texas, entered into a 
contract with the City of Hugo, Oklahoma, to purchase large quantities of 
water to meet Irving’s growing demand.4 However, the Oklahoma Water 
Resources Board (the Board) denied Hugo’s appropriation applications and 
the State of Oklahoma, under the protection of the Red River Compact, 
subsequently passed a series of state statutes placing significant burdens on 
the sale of water for out-of-state use.5 Hugo and Irving brought suit against 
the members of the Board, seeking a declaration that the Oklahoma statutes 
governing the Board’s water allocation decisions were “unconstitutional 
under the dormant Commerce Clause.”6 In 2011, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decided that political subdivisions, such as cities and 
municipalities, lack standing against their parent states to bring suit alleging 
a violation of rights under a substantive provision of the United States 
Constitution.7 The court upheld the Oklahoma statutes that placed 
additional and discriminatory burdens on applicants seeking water 
appropriation for out-of-state use (as compared to applicants seeking 
appropriation for in-state use) despite the fact that such statutes clearly 
seem to violate the dormant Commerce Clause. This ruling not only denied 
potential revenue, taxes, and investment capital to the State of Oklahoma, 
but also prohibited job creation from usage of the water in North Texas. 
Additionally, it effectively granted the state power to discriminate in 
interstate commerce and deprived an injured political subdivision of a 
federal court remedy. 
This note explores the application of the political subdivision standing 
doctrine in Hugo and the court’s reasoning for denying standing to a party 
that seems to be entitled to protection under the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Part II provides an overview of the Commerce Clause and the development 
of the political subdivision standing doctrine leading up to Hugo. Part III 
presents Hugo, including a statement of facts, the procedural history, an 
explanation of the majority opinion, and a discussion of the dissenting 
opinion. Part IV examines why the court should have found standing 
existed under the political subdivision standing doctrine and argues that 
Hugo would have prevailed on the merits had standing been found. Part V 
discusses the broad consequences of the court’s finding. 
                                                                                                                 
 4. City of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 1251, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 5. Id. at 1254. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 1257-58. 
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II. Law Leading Up to Hugo 
A. The Interstate Commerce Clause 
1. An Overview of the Commerce Clause 
The Interstate Commerce Clause contains an enumerated power that 
vests in Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States.”8 This clause serves to impede state efforts to unfairly advance their 
own state interests at the expense of the national economy and out-of-state 
consumers.9 Implicit in this positive grant of authority is the negative, or 
dormant, Commerce Clause authority that voids state legislation unduly 
burdening interstate commerce, even if Congress has not affirmatively 
legislated in the area addressed by state law.10 In effect, the dormant 
Commerce Clause is a judicial creation designed to fill the void when 
Congress has failed to preserve constitutional limits of power. Thus, the 
clause is “dormant” because, although Congress has not legislated in the 
area, Supreme Court decisions have effectively created a protected interest 
and granted relief, even in the absence of congressional action.11 
The purpose of recognizing the dormant Commerce Clause is to prohibit 
“economic protectionism,” which the Supreme Court defined as “regulatory 
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-
of-state competitors.”12 There is a two-step analysis when a state law is 
challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause. First, a court determines 
whether the state regulation discriminates against interstate commerce 
either facially or as practically applied.13 If the discrimination is overt on its 
face, the state regulation is subject to strict scrutiny and will only be upheld 
if it is necessary to the satisfaction of a compelling state end.14 The burden 
rests on the state to justify the regulation in terms of the local benefits and 
lack of alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.15 A 
                                                                                                                 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3. 
 9. E.g., New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338-39 (1982). 
 10. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 11. See generally Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). 
 12. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1994) (quoting New 
Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 13. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
338 (2007). 
 14. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). 
 15. Id. 
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state regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce is, therefore, 
“virtually per se invalid”16 unless the state can demonstrate the legislation is 
“the least discriminatory alternative” to advance a legitimate local 
interest.17 Second, if the state statute is nondiscriminatory on its face but is 
discriminatory as applied, the court will apply a balancing test called the 
“Pike Balancing Test.”18 The test weighs the rule’s local benefit against its 
burden on interstate commerce.19 If the burden on interstate commerce is 
greater than the local benefit, the state statute is unconstitutional.20 
Conversely, if the local benefit is greater than the burden on interstate 
commerce, the state statute is constitutional.21 
State attempts at economic protectionism are generally unconstitutional 
unless they meet one of the exceptions to the Commerce Clause. These 
exceptions include discrimination in markets where the state itself is a 
participant22 and discriminatory state regulations authorized by Congress.23 
One potential method under the latter exception is for Congress to use its 
power under the Commerce Clause to “confer[] upon the States an ability to 
restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise 
enjoy.”24 
2. Using the Commerce Clause to Strike Down Restrictive State Laws 
The United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts have used the 
dormant Commerce Clause to strike down state laws burdening interstate 
commerce despite state claims of authority through congressional intent. 
The dispositive question in these cases has been whether Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). 
 17. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337-38. 
 18. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 19. Id. The Court declared the general rule was as follows: “Where the statute regulates 
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Id. (citing Huron 
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. The Court went on to determine the limits of the rule by stating:  
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. 
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the 
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as 
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. 
Id. 
 22. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). 
 23. See New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1982). 
 24. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980). 
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authorized the states to impose the specific restrictions at issue. To 
determine if the state action was in fact authorized, courts have determined 
a degree of congressional intent specificity necessary to survive a 
Commerce Clause attack. 
Early Supreme Court cases recognized Congress’s power to validate 
unconstitutional provisions of state laws as long as “Congress ha[d] 
expressly stated its intent and policy.”25 This standard of “expressly stated” 
was reaffirmed in New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire when the 
Court struck down a state statute and refused to “rewrite its legislation 
based on mere speculation as to what Congress ‘probably had in mind.’”26 
In that case, the State of New Hampshire argued that the Federal Power Act 
passed by Congress granted the state authority to prohibit exportation of 
hydroelectric energy generated within its borders.27 However, the Supreme 
Court determined that the provision at issue in the Federal Power Act was 
not an affirmative grant of authority for the state to violate the Commerce 
Clause by restricting the flow of electricity in interstate commerce.28 
In the seminal decision of Sporhase v. Nebraska, the United States 
Supreme Court invalidated a Nebraska statute that effectively banned the 
interstate sale or use of Nebraska groundwater to any states with which it 
did not have reciprocal water agreements.29 On appeal, the Court 
determined that since water was an article of commerce, the state could 
restrict its transfer across state lines if the regulation “evenhandedly” 
advanced a legitimate local public interest with only an “incidental” effect 
on interstate commerce.30 However, the state’s restriction of groundwater 
exportation did not survive this “strictest scrutiny” test because there was 
insufficient evidence that the reciprocity requirement significantly 
advanced, and was not “narrowly tailored” to, the state’s public interest of 
conservation and preservation.31 In response to Nebraska’s claim that the 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427 (1946). 
 26. 455 U.S. at 343 (quoting United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 
319 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 27. Id. at 335-36. 
 28. Id. at 344. 
 29. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982). 
 30. Id. at 954 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
 31. Id. at 957-58. Sporhase did recognize that “under certain circumstances each State 
may restrict water within its borders.” Id. at 956. For instance, a state could favor its own 
citizens in a time of shortage or a “demonstrably arid” state could establish that a ban on 
exportation was necessary for the purpose of conservation and preservation. Id. at 957-58. In 
City of El Paso v. Reynolds, the legitimate public interest test from Sporhase was further 
limited to allow a state statute to discriminate against another state’s citizens with respect to 
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thirty-seven statutes and interstate compacts deferring to state water law 
showed an implication that Congress intended to give permission to place a 
burden on interstate commerce, the Court concluded that the compact and 
statutory language did not show an intent to remove constitutional 
constraints on the pertinent state laws.32 To effectuate the required intent, 
the Court held that congressional consent “to the unilateral imposition of 
unreasonable burdens on commerce” must be “expressly stated.”33 
Just two years after Sporhase, the Court held that congressional intent 
was required to be “unmistakably clear” in order “for a state regulation to 
be removed from the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause.”34 In South-
Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, the State of Alaska 
imposed a statute that required timber taken from state owned lands to be 
processed in state prior to export.35 The Alaska Legislature based its 
regulation on a federal statute that imposed the same requirement on timber 
from federal lands.36 The Court found that Congress must have 
“affirmatively contemplate[d] otherwise invalid state legislation” before 
such legislation could violate the dormant Commerce Clause.37 This 
requirement for “affirmative contemplation” suggested “the need for a 
particular issue to be directly in front of Congress,” thus precluding the 
necessary “affirmative contemplation” in the absence of specific language 
restricting interstate commerce in the compact.38 By establishing a rule 
requiring the clear expression of congressional approval, the Court set out 
to protect unrepresented out-of-state interests from being adversely affected 
by restraints on commerce from state legislative action.39 Further, the Court 
                                                                                                                 
groundwater allocation to the extent that the water in question was essential to human 
survival. 563 F. Supp. 379, 389 (D.N.M. 1983), superseded by 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 
1984); see Andrew, supra note 3, at 187. 
 32. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958-60. 
 33. Id. at 960. The Court reaffirmed New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire and 
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin in holding, “In the instances in which we have found such 
consent, Congress’ intent and policy to sustain state legislation from attack under the 
Commerce Clause was expressly stated.” Id. (quoting New Eng. Power Co., 455 U.S. at 343) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 34. S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984). 
 35. Id. at 84. 
 36. Id. at 84, 88-89. 
 37. Id. at 91-92. 
 38. Olen Paul Matthews & Michael Pease, The Commerce Clause, Interstate Compacts, 
and Marketing Water Across State Boundaries, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601, 624 (2006) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 92. The Court’s policy in creating this rule was based on 
representation. If a state was allowed to burden commerce, “the brunt of regulations” would 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss2/4
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refused to infer congressional intent from the fact that the Alaska state 
policy was consistent with or possibly even furthered Congress’s goals in 
enacting the federal policy.40 
3. Limiting the Commerce Clause Through Interstate Compacts 
Another potential method to limit the dormant Commerce Clause under 
the congressional authorization exception is through the states’ use of 
interstate compacts. Interstate compacts are congressionally ratified 
agreements between states.41 These compacts are interpreted as federal law 
and, as such, are immune from dormant Commerce Clause attacks.42 
Compacts can authorize states to act in ways that would otherwise conflict 
with the dormant Commerce Clause, such as by placing restrictions on 
interstate commerce.43 However, Congress’s consent to a compact “does 
not also operate as a kind of blanket approval for state actions under a 
compact which otherwise would violate Commerce Clause restrictions.”44 
To determine whether a compact between states contains the requisite 
congressional intent to preempt constitutional rights, various courts have 
applied the “expressly stated,”45 “unmistakably clear,”46 and “affirmatively 
contemplate[d]”47 standards to the compact language. Since an interstate 
compact becomes federal law upon congressional ratification, the power 
derived from an interstate compact by a state to restrict interstate commerce 
must also pass this dormant Commerce Clause analysis.48 
                                                                                                                 
have a significant effect on citizens from other states not represented in that jurisdiction. Id. 
On the other hand, Congress’s actions presented less danger that one state would exploit 
citizens of another state because all segments of the country were represented. Id. 
 40. Id. at 92-93. 
 41. Matthews & Pease, supra note 38, at 626. 
 42. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm’n, 769 F.2d 568, 569-70 
(9th Cir. 1985), aff’g 590 F. Supp. 293, 296 (D. Mont. 1983) (per curiam). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 570 (Tashima, J., concurring) (quoting Reply Brief for Appellant at 3). 
 45. New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982) (quoting 
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 US. 408, 427 (1946)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 46. S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984). 
 47. Id. at 91-92. 
 48. Id. (“[F]or a state regulation to be removed from the reach of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, congressional intent must be unmistakably clear. The requirement that 
Congress affirmatively contemplate otherwise invalid state legislation is mandated by the 
policies underlying the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.”); see also Hillside Dairy Inc. 
v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003) (“Congress certainly has the power to authorize state 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
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B. Development of the Political Subdivision Standing Doctrine 
In order for a court to undertake this dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis, the city or municipality must have standing to bring suit in federal 
court against its parent state.49 Political subdivisions, such as cities and 
municipalities, are created and delegated authority by their parent states.50 
Thus, states hold broad powers over their subdivisions. Subdivisions, 
however, do not always agree when states exercise this power over them in 
ways that conflict with the Constitution or federal law. As a result, the 
political subdivision standing doctrine has developed over time to 
determine when federal courts retain jurisdiction over controversies 
between political subdivisions and their parent states. 
1. The Hunter Line of Cases 
In an early series of cases at the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
Supreme Court held that political subdivisions could not sue their parent 
states for constitutional violations.51 In the Court’s first political subdivision 
doctrine case, Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania 
statute authorizing the annexation of the City of Allegheny into the City of 
Pittsburgh, despite Allegheny’s claim that the statute violated its citizens’ 
rights under the Contract Clause and Fourteenth Amendment.52 The Court 
concluded that political subdivisions are “created as convenient agencies” 
for exercising the powers entrusted to them by the state, so “the State is 
supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state 
                                                                                                                 
regulations that burden or discriminate against interstate commerce, but we will not assume 
that it has done so unless such an intent is clearly expressed.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 49. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990) (“It is well established, however, 
that before a federal court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the court must establish the requisite standing to sue.”); see also 
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (“[T]his Court has always required that a litigant have ‘standing’ to 
challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit.”). 
 50. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cnty. v. City of Camden, 
465 U.S. 208, 215 (1984) (noting that a municipality derives its authority from the State); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964) (“[Political subdivisions] have been 
traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the 
State . . . .”); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (stating that a 
municipality “remains the creature of the state exercising and holding powers and privileges 
subject to the sovereign will”). 
 51. See Williams v. Mayor of Balt., 289 U.S. 36 (1933); Trenton, 262 U.S. 182; Hunter 
v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
 52. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 176-77. 
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constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the 
Constitution of the United States.”53 
The Supreme Court expanded this rule in City of Trenton v. New 
Jersey.54 In Trenton, the city challenged its parent state’s imposition of a 
fee for withdrawing water from the Delaware River as violating both the 
Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.55 
The Court followed its reasoning from Hunter, holding that a municipal 
corporation was a “creature of the state” and the state could “withhold, 
grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit.”56 The Court 
concluded that the State’s authority to grant a political subdivision its 
powers prevented the subdivision from bringing the suit: 
 The power of the state, unrestrained by the contract clause or 
the Fourteenth Amendment, over the rights and property of cities 
held and used for “governmental purposes” cannot be 
questioned. . . . This court has never held that these subdivisions 
may invoke such restraints [based on the Contract Clause or 
Fourteenth Amendment] upon the power of the state.57 
The Court later applied the Trenton rule to hold that a political 
subdivision lacked standing to bring an equal protection challenge under the 
Fourteenth Amendment against its parent state’s actions.58 In Williams v. 
Mayor of Baltimore, the mayor and city council of Baltimore challenged the 
validity of a state statute exempting a railroad from local taxes.59 In 
rejecting the challenge, the Court explained that “[a] municipal corporation, 
created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or 
immunities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition 
to the will of its creator.”60 
  
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. at 178-79. 
 54. See 262 U.S. at 183-84.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 189-90. 
 57. Id. at 188. 
 58. See Williams v. Mayor of Balt., 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933). 
 59. Id. at 39. 
 60. Id. at 40 (citing R.R. Comm’n v. L.A. Ry. Corp., 280 U.S. 145 (1929); Risty v. Chi., 
Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 378 (1926); City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 
192 (1923); Trenton, 262 U.S. 182; City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U.S. 
394 (1919); City of Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539 (1905)). 
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2. Modern Courts’ Interpretation of the Hunter Line of Cases 
Despite the broad language in earlier cases, the Supreme Court and lower 
courts have shied away from erecting an absolute bar to political 
subdivisions challenging the actions of parent states in federal court.61 In 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Supreme Court explained: 
[A] correct reading of the seemingly unconfined dicta of Hunter 
and kindred cases is not that the State has plenary power to 
manipulate in every conceivable way, for every conceivable 
purpose, the affairs of its municipal corporations, but rather that 
the State’s authority is unrestrained by the particular prohibitions 
of the Constitution considered in those cases.62 
While Gomillion was not a suit between a municipality and its parent 
state, its interpretation of the political subdivision doctrine definitively 
limited the application of Hunter, Trenton, and Williams to political 
subdivision challenges under the Contract Clause and Fourteenth 
Amendment.63 The Court also refused to acknowledge a complete bar to all 
suits by political subdivisions against their parent states in finding that 
“[l]egislative control of municipalities . . . lies within the scope of relevant 
limitations imposed by the United States Constitution.”64 
More recently, in Branson School District RE-82 v. Romer, the Tenth 
Circuit found standing of a political subdivision in a preemption case and 
formulated a test that allows standing if: (1) the political subdivision asserts 
a challenge to a state action under a federal constitutional provision written 
to protect “collective” or “structural rights”65 and (2) the political 
subdivision is “substantially independent” from the parent state.66 The court 
read the authoritative line of cases as “stand[ing] only for the limited 
proposition that a municipality may not bring a constitutional challenge 
against its creating state when the constitutional provision that supplies the 
basis for the complaint was written to protect individual rights, as opposed 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).  
 62. Id. at 344. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. at 344-45. In Gomillion, the African American citizens of Alabama argued that a 
redistricting plan violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 340. The Court held that when 
“state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right,” such as 
the Fifteenth Amendment, the state is not “insulated from federal judicial review.” Id. at 347. 
 65. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
 66. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 629 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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to collective or structural rights.”67 In Branson, three school districts 
brought a Supremacy Clause challenge against an amendment to the 
Colorado Constitution, alleging that the amendment violated a federal land 
trust established by Congress in the Colorado Enabling Act.68 The court 
found the Supremacy Clause to be a structural protection and, therefore, 
held that the “political subdivision [had] standing to bring a constitutional 
claim against its creating state when the substance of its claim relie[d] on 
the Supremacy Clause and a putatively controlling federal law.”69 
The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation in Branson is but one example of how 
cases interpreting the rights of political subdivisions have caused confusion 
among modern courts and have ultimately led to a split among the circuits. 
The Ninth Circuit appears to be the only jurisdiction that follows a per se 
rule that political subdivisions cannot sue their parent states under any 
constitutional provision.70 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have joined the 
Tenth Circuit in rejecting a per se rule against allowing suits by political 
subdivisions,71 while the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have avoided 
definitively resolving the issue.72 It is unclear whether the Second Circuit 
has adopted a per se rule.73 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. at 628. 
 68. Id. at 625-27. 
 69. Id. at 628. 
 70. See Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(ruling that the political subdivision “lacks standing to bring an action against the state in 
federal court—at least to the extent that its action challenges the validity of state regulations 
on due process and Supremacy Clause grounds”); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. 
v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360 (9th Cir. 1998) (reiterating its interpretation of the Hunter 
line of cases as a per se bar to municipal suits against their parent states). 
 71. See Donelon v. La. Div. of Admin. Law ex rel. Wise, 522 F.3d 564, 567 n.6 (5th 
Cir. 2008) (“Although some circuits have followed a per se rule that political subdivisions 
may not sue their parent states under any constitutional provision, that is not the rule in this 
circuit.”); United States v. Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450, 1455 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[N]o per se rule 
applies in this Circuit.”). 
 72. See City of Charleston v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 57 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 
1995) (noting that the political subdivision standing doctrine is “unclear”); Amato v. 
Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 755 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Judicial support for [a per se] rule may be 
waning with time.”); S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Twp. of Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 504 
(6th Cir. 1986) (“There may be occasions in which a political subdivision is not prevented, 
by virtue of its status as a subdivision of the state, from challenging the constitutionality of 
state legislation.”). 
 73. Compare City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(holding that political subdivisions could not challenge a state statute under the Fourteenth 
Amendment), with Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding 
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III. City of Hugo v. Nichols: Tenth Circuit Denies Standing to a Political 
Subdivision Bringing a Commerce Clause Claim 
In 2011 the Tenth Circuit heard another political subdivision standing 
doctrine case in City of Hugo v. Nichols.74 This time, however, the dispute 
involved a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to various state statutes 
passed under the protection of an interstate compact.75 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
In 1955 Congress granted Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana 
permission to negotiate an interstate compact to equitably apportion the 
stream waters of the Red River and its tributaries.76 Twenty-three years 
later, the states approved the Red River Compact (the Compact) to divide 
the Red River and its tributaries for purposes of water apportionment 
between the four participating states.77 Shortly thereafter, Congress gave its 
consent and the compact became federal law in 1980.78 
Accordingly, the Compact resulted in the Oklahoma Legislature enacting 
a series of statutes designed to prevent or restrict the exportation of 
Oklahoma stream water.79 The initial legislation included a now expired 
moratorium on the sale of water outside of the state, as well as several 
antitrade statutes designed to prevent Oklahoma residents from selling 
Oklahoma stream water to nonresidents.80 However, the statutes at issue in 
Hugo were enacted in 2009 and further prevented and burdened the transfer 
                                                                                                                 
that a city “had no standing to assert constitutional claims,” but noting that a political 
subdivision might have standing to assert a claim under the Fifth Amendment). 
 74. See 656 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 75. Id. at 1254. 
 76. City of Hugo v. Nichols, No. CIV-08-303-JTM, 2010 WL 1816345, at *2 (E.D. 
Okla. April 30, 2010), vacated, 656 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. The Red River Compact was part of Public Law No. 96-564. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. The Oklahoma Moratorium expired on November 1, 2009, five years from its 
effective date. Id. The antitrade provisions still in effect include: (1) 82 OKLA. STAT. § 
105.16(B) (2011) (providing that surface water appropriations not fully utilized within seven 
years of authorization would be approved only if the proposed use would promote the 
beneficial use of water in Oklahoma), (2) 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1085.2(2) (prohibiting the Board 
from making a contract to convey title or use water outside of Oklahoma without 
authorization from the Oklahoma legislature), and (3) 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1085.22 
(prohibiting the Board from permitting the sale or resale of any water for use outside the 
state). Hugo, 2010 WL 1816345, at *2; see also Joint Brief of All Appellants at 14-15, City 
of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-7043, 10-7044), 2010 WL 
3736199, at *4. 
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of Oklahoma stream water for out-of-state use.81 These recent enactments 
(collectively, the Oklahoma statutes): (1) impose additional restrictions on 
permits to be issued by the Board for use of water outside of Oklahoma,82 
(2) require legislative approval of permits for the out-of-state use of water 
apportioned to Oklahoma under an interstate compact,83 (3) require the 
Board to determine whether water subject to a permit application for out-of-
state use can be transported to alleviate shortages in the state,84 and (4) 
subject permits granted by the Board for out-of-state use to a review by the 
Board every ten years to determine if there has been a change in the water 
needs and availability in Oklahoma.85 
Prior to the enactment of the recent statutes, the City of Hugo86 and City 
of Irving87 entered into a contract whereby Hugo would sell, and Irving 
would purchase, substantial quantities of Oklahoma stream water 
appropriated under the Compact to Hugo from the Kiamichi River.88 At 
contract formation, Hugo held two stream water permits issued by the 
Board.89 Hugo’s 1954 permit provided an appropriation of 1700 acre-feet of 
stream water per year and its 1972 permit authorized the appropriation of 
28,800 acre-feet of stream water per year.90 A third application was filed 
with the Board in 2002 requesting appropriation of an additional 200,000 
acre-feet of stream water from the Kiamichi River per year.91 The Board, 
however, did not rule on either the third application or on petitions filed in 
November 2008 “to change the place of use for the 1954 and 1972 
permits,” as rulings would require consideration of the Oklahoma statutes 
challenged by Hugo and Irving.92 Hugo and Irving thereafter brought suit 
against the members of the Board,93 seeking a declaration that the relevant 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Hugo, 2010 WL 1816345, at *5-6. 
 82. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.12A(B)(1) (2011). 
 83. Id. § 105.12A(D). 
 84. Id. § 105.12(A)(5). 
 85. Id. § 105.12(F). 
 86. The City of Hugo is an Oklahoma municipality located in Choctaw County, 
Oklahoma. Hugo, 2010 WL 1816345, at *1. 
 87. The City of Irving is a Texas municipality located in Dallas County, Texas. Id. 
 88. Id. at *2. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. The Oklahoma Water Resources Board is an Oklahoma state agency consisting of 
nine individual members responsible for enforcing the laws enacted by Oklahoma regarding 
the appropriation and use of the surface waters of Oklahoma. City of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 
F.3d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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Oklahoma laws governing the Board’s water allocation decisions were 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and requesting an injunction 
prohibiting their enforcement.94 
On April 30, 2010, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Oklahoma granted the Board’s cross-motion for summary 
judgment in part, as to plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause claims,95 and denied it 
in part.96 The district court held that Congress’s approval of the Compact 
language was sufficient to protect the Oklahoma statutes from a dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge.97 In doing so, the court determined that 
Congress’s ratification of the Compact authorized Oklahoma to enact the 
contested statutes to control waters within its borders.98 
The case was subsequently appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals on May 28, 2010.99 On appeal, neither party raised the issue of 
whether the court had jurisdiction.100 However, the “court ordered the 
parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing” the issue of standing for 
each appellant to bring suit against the Board.101 
  
                                                                                                                 
 94. Hugo, 2010 WL 1816345, at *2. 
 95. Id. at *7. 
 96. Id. The district court denied defendants’ summary judgment argument that the case 
should be dismissed “on grounds of mootness due to recent legislation or based on any need 
to defer to the Compact Commission, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.” Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Notice of Appeal at 1, City of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(Nos. 10-7043, 10-7044). 
 100. Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1255. Despite the fact that the district court exercised jurisdiction 
and neither party contested the standing issue on appeal, the court exercised its “obligation 
to assess its own jurisdiction” and determine if the appellants met the standing requirements 
of Article III of the United States Constitution. Id. (citing Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
631 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 2011)). 
 101. Id. In an order filed on June 14, 2011, the parties were ordered to file supplemental 
briefs to address two issues: 
 1. Whether City of Hugo has standing to sue the Oklahoma Water 
Resources Board under the political subdivision standing doctrine as described 
in Branson School District [RE-82] v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 2. If this court concludes City of Hugo does not have standing to sue, 
whether City of Hugo’s lack of standing impacts City of Irving’s standing. 
Order at 2, Hugo, 656 F.3d 1251 (Nos. 10-7043, 10-7044). 
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B. Majority Opinion 
In a 2-1 decision,102 the Tenth Circuit held that Hugo, as “a political 
subdivision of Oklahoma, lack[ed] standing to sue the Board under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.”103 As a result, Irving also lacked standing 
because “Irving’s standing [was] premised solely on its contract with 
Hugo” and therefore Irving’s alleged injury could not be redressed by the 
relief requested.104 Thus, the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s order 
and remanded the case to the district court to be dismissed for lack of 
federal jurisdiction.105 
The Tenth Circuit began its discussion with a brief history of the political 
subdivision standing doctrine dating back to Trenton and the subsequent 
development of the doctrine in Williams, Gomillion, and Branson.106 In 
acknowledging “the broad language in these earl[ier] cases,” the court 
noted that the Supreme Court and circuit courts “have shied away from 
erecting an absolute bar to political subdivisions asserting rights against 
their parent states in federal court.”107 In support, the court pointed towards 
Gomillion as limiting the state’s unrestrained authority as against its 
political subdivisions only by the particular constitutional prohibitions 
considered in Trenton (Contract and Due Process Clauses) and Williams 
(Fourteenth Amendment).108 The court agreed with Gomillion and was 
unwilling to “grant[] the states ‘plenary power to manipulate in every 
conceivable way . . . the affairs of municipal corporations.’”109 
Instead, the court shifted its focus to the holding in Branson that granted 
“federal jurisdiction over a political subdivision’s claim brought under a 
federal statute as a Supremacy Clause claim.”110 The court interpreted 
Branson as making the limited distinction that a political subdivision could 
not sue its parent state for a constitutional violation if the subject provision 
was written to protect “individual rights.”111 Rather, Branson held that a 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Judge Murphy authored the majority opinion, with Judge Gorsuch joining. See 
Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1253. Judge Matheson issued the dissenting opinion. Id. at 1265 
(Matheson, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. at 1254 (majority opinion). 
 104. Id. at 1254, 1265. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1255-56. 
 107. Id. at 1256. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 
344 (1960)). 
 110. Id. (citing Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
 111. Id. (quoting Branson, 161 F.3d at 628) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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political subdivision could only bring a constitutional challenge under a 
“constitutional provision[] designed to protect ‘collective or structural 
rights’ (i.e. the Supremacy Clause).”112 The court therefore maintained that 
Branson should simply be read as ruling “that Trenton and Williams do not 
bar suits by municipalities against their parent states to enforce, via the 
Supremacy Clause, the provisions of federal statutes conferring rights on 
those very municipalities.”113 
With the Branson rule in mind, the court subsequently examined the 
findings of standing in Branson and Kaw Tribe that claimed Supremacy 
Clause violations and compared them to the dormant Commerce Clause 
claim in the present case.114 In its analysis, the court determined that the 
states in both prior cases asserted a new state law or conducted actions in 
such a way as to conflict with a federal statute.115 In these cases, the 
Supremacy Clause was “not a source of any federal rights.”116 Instead, the 
sources of substantive rights originally given to the political subdivisions 
were congressionally enacted federal statutes “and the Supremacy Clause 
was invoked merely to guarantee, as a structural matter, that federal law 
predominate[d] over conflicting state law.”117 On the other hand, the court 
determined that “[t]he dormant Commerce Clause . . . itself provide[d] 
substantive rights” to a party in that it directly conferred power to the 
federal government and “limit[ed] the states’ ability to act in certain 
ways.”118 Therefore, claims brought under the Commerce Clause do not fit 
into the court’s interpretation of “collective or structural.”119 
Ultimately, the court concluded that Hugo lacked standing under 
Branson because the dormant Commerce Clause claim was “based on a 
substantive provision of the Constitution, and . . . the Supreme Court ha[d] 
made clear that the Constitution [did] not contemplate the rights of political 
subdivisions as against their parent states.”120 In doing so, the court 
affirmed the rule that a political subdivision could only sue its parent state 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. (quoting Branson, 161 F.3d at 628). 
 113. Id. at 1260-61. See generally Hous. Auth. of Kaw Tribe of Indians v. City of Ponca 
City, 952 F.2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1991); Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 114. See Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1256-58. 
 115. Id. at 1256-57. 
 116. Id. at 1256 (quoting Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 
(1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117. Id. at 1257. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. at 1257-58. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss2/4
2013]       NOTE 367 
 
 
“when Congress has enacted statutory law specifically providing rights to 
[political subdivisions].”121 
C. Dissenting Opinion 
In his dissent, Judge Matheson disagreed with the majority’s 
interpretation of Branson and its finding that Hugo lacked standing.122 
Judge Matheson argued that “the dormant Commerce Clause protect[ed] a 
structural right and thereby support[ed] political subdivision standing.”123 In 
his argument, Judge Matheson highlighted two problems with the 
majority’s analysis. First, the majority interpreted Branson as a narrow 
exception to the limited political subdivision standing doctrine of the early 
cases.124 Judge Matheson, on the other hand, interpreted Branson as a 
broader exception and method to determine if a claim fit within the 
structural rights category.125 Second, the majority’s holding effectively 
limited a structural rights claim under Branson to only include a preemption 
claim.126 Judge Matheson argued that claims under the dormant Commerce 
Clause also fell into the structural rights category.127 
As a resolution to the first problem, Judge Matheson argued that while 
“Branson granted political subdivision standing on a federal preemption 
claim, [the Tenth Circuit did not declare] that a political subdivision could 
sue its parent state only for a preemption claim” as was maintained by the 
majority.128 Rather, Judge Matheson read Branson to “recognize[] a broader 
exception that [allowed] future consideration of claims based on 
constitutional provisions written to protect structural rights.”129 Instead of 
limiting the political subdivision standing doctrine to only the specific 
constitutional claims presented in cases from Trenton to Branson, the court 
was required to determine if “the constitutional provision that supplie[d] the 
basis for the complaint was written to protect individual rights, as opposed 
to collective or structural rights.”130 Judge Matheson further reasoned that if 
the Branson court intended to limit its holding to only preemption claims, 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. at 1257.  
 122. Id. (Matheson, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. at 1266. 
 124. Id. at 1269-70. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1270-73. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1270. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (quoting Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 
1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the court’s “distinction between individual and structural rights would be 
superfluous.”131 
Based on this understanding of Branson, Judge Matheson next attacked 
the majority’s determination that the dormant Commerce Clause was not 
based on a structural right.132 In contrast to the majority’s comparison 
between a preemption claim and a dormant Commerce Clause claim, Judge 
Matheson argued that “[d]ormant Commerce Clause claims are more like 
preemption than individual rights claims because they concern the relative 
power of federal and state government.”133 Judge Matheson defined a 
preemption claim as one “alleg[ing] that a federal statute is supreme . . . to 
conflicting state law. [Thus it] is structural because it concerns the relative 
authority of federal and state government.”134 In contrast, Judge Matheson 
defined “[a]n individual right claim” as one “concern[ing] the limits of 
government authority over the individual.”135 Therefore, according to Judge 
Matheson, dormant Commerce Clause claims should be considered 
structural rights “because they concern the relative power of federal and 
state government” by asking whether a state law unconstitutionally 
inhibited interstate commerce, and thus, “was ‘written to protect’ the 
allocation of power between the federal government and states,” not 
individual rights.136 
Judge Matheson further argued that Hugo also met the second 
requirement of the political subdivision doctrine in Branson—that “a 
political subdivision be ‘substantially independent’ from its parent state to 
have standing.”137 Similar to the school districts in Branson, Hugo was 
substantially independent of its parent state because it could “hold property 
in its own name, enter into contracts, and sue and be sued in its own 
name.”138 As a result, “[b]ecause Hugo raised a claim based on a 
constitutional provision that protect[ed] structural rights” and was 
independent of its parent state, Judge Matheson would have held that Hugo 
had standing and that the court should have reached a decision on the 
merits.139 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Id. at 1271. 
 132. See id. at 1270-75. 
 133. Id. at 1272. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1272-73. 
 137. Id. at 1275. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1265, 1275. It is important to note that Judge Matheson found Irving had 
standing even if Hugo did not because the political subdivision doctrine did not apply to 
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A. The Majority Misinterpreted Precedential Case Law and Should Have 
Found Standing Existed Under the Political Subdivision Doctrine 
In Hugo, the majority and the dissent came to strikingly different 
opinions. While both opinions agreed that early political subdivision 
standing doctrine cases took a strict, absolutist view of a political 
subdivision’s ability to sue its parent state, the judges parted ways when 
interpreting Branson.140 The majority ignored the important Branson 
distinction between individual and structural rights, choosing instead to 
interpret Branson as creating a limited exception to the strict early views for 
claims brought under the Supremacy Clause.141 In contrast, Judge Matheson 
correctly interpreted Branson as recognizing a broader exception that 
establishe[d] a framework to “allow future consideration of claims [brought 
under] constitutional provisions written to protect structural rights.”142 The 
issue therefore hinges on the application of the Branson framework to 
determine whether the dormant Commerce Clause protects individual or 
structural rights. 
1. Interpretation of Branson 
The Hugo majority read Branson as standing for the limited proposition 
that a political subdivision can sue its parent state only if suit was brought 
under a preemption claim.143 In doing so, the court mistakenly held that the 
Branson court’s use of the terms “collective” and “structural” referred only 
to a situation where a political subdivision brought suit against its parent 
state under a federal statute through the Supremacy Clause.144 This 
understanding resulted in a political subdivision only having standing to sue 
its parent state when Congress had directly conferred upon the subdivision 
                                                                                                                 
Irving. Id. at 1265. Furthermore, “Irving . . . asserted a justiciable claim” against the Board 
because the Oklahoma water statutes interfered with its contract with Hugo and its only 
remedy would be “a favorable ruling on its dormant Commerce Clause challenge.” Id. at 
1265, 1275-76. For additional discussion on the “justiciable” requirement of a claim, see 
Alexander Willscher, The Justiciability of Municipal Preemption Challenges to State Law, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 243 (2000). 
 140. Compare Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1256 (majority opinion), with id. at 1266 (Matheson, J., 
dissenting). 
 141. See id. at 1261 (majority opinion). 
 142. Id. at 1270 (Matheson, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 1257 (majority opinion). 
 144. Id. 
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a specific right and the parent state had denied it the benefit of that right in 
violation of the federal law. 
The majority reasoned that, in Branson, “[T]he source of substantive 
rights was a federal statute specifically directed at protecting political 
subdivisions, and the Supremacy Clause was” used to structurally guarantee 
that the federal law preempted the challenged state law.145 In contrast, it 
held in Hugo that the dormant Commerce Clause, not a federal statute, 
directly provided substantive rights to the political subdivision.146 Thus, the 
dormant Commerce Clause did not meet the limited exception from 
Branson that only allowed suits “when Congress [had] enacted statutory 
law specifically providing rights to” the political subdivision that 
contradicted state actions.147 
However, a more accurate reading of Branson recognizes a broader 
exception to the political subdivision standing doctrine that allows standing 
for claims based on constitutional provisions written to protect “structural” 
rights. Rather than specifically limiting political subdivision standing to 
certain preemption claims, the Branson court expanded on the early cases to 
block standing only when the “constitutional provision that supplies the 
basis for the complaint was written to protect individual rights, as opposed 
to collective or structural rights.”148 Thus, a political subdivision has 
standing to sue its parent state in federal court if (1) the nature of its legal 
challenge to a state action was under a federal constitutional provision 
written to protect “collective” or “structural” rights, rather than individual 
rights; and (2) the political subdivision is “substantially independent” from 
its parent state.149 
As Judge Matheson argued, if, as the majority held, Branson intended to 
restrict political subdivision standing to preemption claims under the 
Supremacy Clause, the Branson court’s distinction between individual and 
structural rights would have been irrelevant.150 Therefore, in order to 
determine if Hugo has standing we must first determine whether Hugo’s 
dormant Commerce Clause claim is based on a structural or individual 
right. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 149. Id. at 629. 
 150. Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1271 (Matheson, J., dissenting). 
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2. Structural v. Individual Rights 
It is evident from the Branson court’s interpretation of Hunter, Trenton, 
and Williams that the Contract Clause, Due Process Clause, and Equal 
Protection Clause all fall into the individual rights category of the Branson 
test.151 It is further made apparent that the Supremacy Clause protects a 
structural right.152 However, the Branson court did not provide much 
additional guidance for distinguishing between a constitutional provision 
“written to protect” an individual right and one “written to protect” a 
structural right.153 
The courts have described a structural right as one that “establishes a 
structure of government which defines the relative powers of the state and 
the federal government.”154 By contrast, an individual right claim concerns 
the limits of government authority over an individual or the relationship 
between the state and the private market.155 Other courts have described 
individual rights as those that “confer fundamental rights on individual 
citizens” and “guarantee[] that all citizens enjoy equal protection of the 
laws and due process of law.”156 
While Branson did not elaborate on its distinction between structural and 
individual rights, the Branson court did provide an example of a structural 
right by declaring that a preemption claim under the Supremacy Clause was 
structural in nature.157 A preemption claim alleges that a federal statute is 
supreme to, or preempts, a conflicting state law.158 This type of “claim is 
structural because it concerns the relative authority [between] federal and 
state government.”159 
Dormant Commerce Clause claims also concern the relative powers of 
the federal and state governments by claiming that a state law 
unconstitutionally interferes with the federal regulation of interstate 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See Williams v. Mayor of Balt., 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933); City of Trenton v. New 
Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 176-77 (1907). 
 152. See Branson, 161 F.3d at 628-29. 
 153. Id. at 628. 
 154. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 958 F. Supp. 1501, 1507-08 (D. Colo. 1997) 
(quoting San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283, 289-90 (S.D. Cal. 
1978)), aff’d, 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 155. Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1260 (majority opinion). 
 156. Branson, 958 F. Supp. at 1507 (quoting Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. at 289-90) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 157. Branson, 161 F.3d at 629. 
 158. Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1272 (Matheson, J., dissenting). 
 159. Id. 
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commerce.160 As an enumerated power of Article 1, Section 8 of the 
Constitution, the Commerce Clause, upon which the dormant Commerce 
Clause is based, was written to protect states’ rights by authorizing and 
limiting the powers of Congress, and allocating power between the federal 
government and the states.161 The Supreme Court has described the 
Commerce Clause as “a self-executing limitation on the power of the States 
to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such commerce.”162 One 
leading commentator stated that “[t]he Fifth and Tenth Circuits . . . have 
limited cities’ standing to cases that involve claims under the Supremacy 
Clause and other structural restrictions on state power, such as the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.”163 Accordingly, claims based on this provision, such as 
the one in Hugo, ask courts to resolve questions of relative federal and state 
power. Thus, the dormant Commerce Clause is a structural right that, 
similar to the Supremacy Clause, acts as a substantive limitation on the 
states’ governmental power in relation to the federal government. 
Therefore, it meets the first part of the Branson test to determine if a 
political subdivision has standing to challenge unconstitutional state 
actions. 
3. Hugo’s Independence 
According to Branson, in addition to making a claim based on a 
structural right, a political subdivision must also be “substantially 
independent” from its parent state in order to have standing.164 This is 
necessary so that the suit does not amount to the state essentially suing 
itself. In this case, “The City of Hugo is substantially independent of [the 
State of] Oklahoma.”165 “Hugo can hold property in its own name, enter 
into contracts, . . . sue and be sued,” obtain property by eminent domain, 
and engage in activity for the benefit of its citizens.166 Therefore, Hugo also 
meets the second part of the political subdivision doctrine test. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 160. Id. at 1273. 
 161. Id. at 1272-73 (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 
105-08 (2005)). 
 162. S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984). 
 163. David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution, 
115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2250 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 164. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 629 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 165. Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1275 (Matheson, J., dissenting). 
 166. Id. (citing 11 OKLA. STAT. §§ 22-101, 22-104, 37-117 (2011)). 
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4. The Court Should Have Found Standing Existed 
A political subdivision that is substantially independent of its parent state 
has standing under the political subdivision standing doctrine to challenge a 
statute passed by its parent state under a constitutional provision that was 
written to protect structural or collective rights.167 As established above, 
Hugo is substantially independent of the State of Oklahoma and has 
challenged various Oklahoma statutes under the dormant Commerce 
Clause, which acts as a structural limitation on the state regulation of 
interstate commerce. Hugo, therefore, had standing to bring its dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge, and the court should have proceeded to reach 
a decision as to whether the Oklahoma statutes unconstitutionally violated 
the Commerce Clause. 
B. Upon Finding Standing, the Court Should Strike Down Oklahoma’s 
Statutes as Unconstitutional 
The Commerce Clause vests Congress with the enumerated and 
exclusive power to regulate commerce between states.168 Implicit in this 
grant of authority is the dormant Commerce Clause, which voids state 
attempts to unduly burden interstate commerce even if Congress has not 
affirmatively legislated in the area addressed by the state law.169 States are 
therefore prohibited from unfairly advancing their own state interests at the 
expense of the national economy by giving their own citizens an advantage 
over out-of-state citizens.170 However, congressional ratification of an 
interstate compact may authorize states to act in ways that would otherwise 
conflict with the dormant Commerce Clause, such as by placing undue 
burdens on out-of-state parties.171 Once Congress approves an interstate 
compact, the compact becomes federal law and the constitutionality of state 
action hinges on whether Congress’s intent in approving the interstate 
compact is sufficiently clear.172 
The Supreme Court has determined the degree of specificity of 
congressional intent required for a state to have the authority to violate the 
Commerce Clause.173 In Sporhase, the Supreme Court announced that the 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Branson, 161 F.3d at 628-29; see also discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
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standard for determining congressional intent to authorize state restrictions 
on interstate commerce is that such authorization must be “expressly 
stated.”174 Subsequent decisions of the Court expanded the standard to also 
include congressional intent that is “unmistakably clear.”175 This high level 
of specificity requires interstate compacts, such as the Red River Compact, 
to contain very specific language in order to meet the Sporhase standard 
and survive a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.176 
1. Applying Sporhase and Wunnicke to the Red River Compact 
While there is no doubt that Congress approved the state-negotiated Red 
River Compact, the Compact does not explicitly prohibit the export of 
water or even make reference to the Commerce Clause.177 Congressional 
consent to the Compact was simply limited to “an equitable apportionment 
among [the compacting states] of the waters of the Red River and its 
tributaries.”178 Sporhase established that an equitable apportionment does 
not in itself demonstrate the required specificity of congressional intent to 
authorize a waiver of Commerce Clause restrictions.179 The leading 
commentators reviewing Sporhase have also agreed, with one major treatise 
summarizing the holding by noting: “In other words, Congress’ mere 
consent to the water compacts was not an unmistakably clear expression of 
intent to authorize unreasonable state burdens on commerce.”180 Thus, the 
congressional authorization to negotiate the Compact and congressional 
ratification of the Compact do not provide the requisite “expressly stated” 
or “unmistakably clear” expression of congressional intent necessary to 
authorize violations of the Commerce Clause. 
Like the Compact, most interstate water compacts in the western United 
States remain silent on transfer rights of the signatory parties, but courts 
have found that some compacts satisfy the Sporhase standard in prohibiting 
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transfers. For instance, the Snake River Compact between Wyoming and 
Idaho states: 
No water of the Snake River shall be diverted in Wyoming for 
use outside the drainage area of the Snake River except with the 
approval of Idaho; and no water of any tributary of the Salt River 
heading in Idaho shall be diverted in Idaho for use outside the 
drainage area of said tributary except with the approval of 
Wyoming.181 
Similarly, the Oregon-California Goose Lake Interstate Compact declares: 
“Export of water from Goose Lake Basin for use outside the basin without 
prior consent of both State legislatures is prohibited.”182 The Kansas-
Nebraska Big Blue River Compact includes the provision: “Neither State 
shall authorize the exportation from the Big Blue River of water originating 
within that basin without the approval of the [compact agency’s] 
administration.”183 Finally, the Yellowstone River Compact provides: “No 
water shall be diverted from the Yellowstone River Basin without the 
unanimous consent of all the signatory States.”184 
The aforementioned interstate compact provisions go far beyond the 
simple allocation of stream water—they explicitly authorize states to 
restrict or forbid interstate water transfers. This type of express language 
constitutes “unmistakably clear” congressional approval of the signatory 
states’ ability to avoid the otherwise applicable Commerce Clause 
restrictions and therefore meets the Sporhase standard of specificity. 
By contrast, the Red River Compact is merely an allocation of interstate 
waters and does not come close to authorizing the State of Oklahoma to 
forbid or burden the exportation of water by a political subdivision. In 
Hugo, the State of Oklahoma argued that the Compact language grants it 
“free and unrestricted use”185 of the state’s allocated water and that nothing 
in the Compact shall “[i]nterfere with or impair the right or power of any 
Signatory State to regulate within its boundaries the appropriation, use, and 
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control of water.”186 While this Compact language could refer to the use of 
water free from constitutional limitations, as the State would contend, it 
more likely refers to the use of water free from downstream delivery 
obligations. Regardless, the ambiguity of the Compact’s language is 
evidence that the Compact does not have “expressly stated” or 
“unmistakably clear” limitations on the exportation of water. By failing to 
meet this standard, Congress could not possibly have “affirmatively 
contemplated” a potential burden on interstate commerce when it ratified 
the Compact. The states are thus free and unrestricted in their use and 
regulation of the water appropriated under the Compact, so long as their 
actions are constitutional. 
While Congress may authorize state-imposed restrictions on interstate 
commerce through its approval of interstate compacts, the Compact 
provides no such authorization. Without specific language in the compact 
banning the exportation of water, Congress has not consented to a state 
violation of the Commerce Clause. As a result, the State of Oklahoma does 
not have the authority to place undue burdens on the exportation of water 
and the court must determine if the challenged Oklahoma statutes can 
survive the applicable constitutional level of review. 
2. Oklahoma Statutes Fail Strict Scrutiny 
Since the Compact does not insulate the Oklahoma statutes from the 
dormant Commerce Clause, the court must apply Commerce Clause 
scrutiny to determine if the statutes are constitutional. The Oklahoma 
statutes at issue obviously do not regulate evenhandedly. While they do not 
strictly forbid water export, they do impose burdens on parties seeking to 
appropriate water for use outside of Oklahoma that are not imposed on 
parties seeking to appropriate water for in-state use. This facial 
discrimination means that the statutes are subject to strict scrutiny and will 
only be upheld as constitutional if they are deemed to be necessary to the 
satisfaction of a compelling state end.187 
The Court has thus far identified only one compelling end in its interstate 
water compact jurisprudence. In Sporhase, the Court held that a state could 
favor its own citizens in times of “severe shortage” if necessary for 
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conservation and preservation.188 Studies published by the Board, however, 
showed that the State of Oklahoma only uses a small percentage of the 
available stream water of the Kiamichi River it has been appropriated under 
the Compact.189 The Board also reported that “fourteen times more stream 
water flows out of Oklahoma during a given year (36 million acre-feet) than 
is actually allocated for annual use in the state (2.6 million acre-feet).”190 In 
sum, Oklahoma has an abundant supply of stream water and is in no danger 
of a “severe shortage” in the foreseeable future. Instead, the Oklahoma 
statutes at issue in Hugo were enacted as a protectionist measure designed 
to further the state’s economic interest at the expense of the economic 
interest of neighboring states such as Texas.191 As a result of these blatantly 
economic protectionist motives and the lack of projected “severe shortage” 
of water supply, Oklahoma does not have a compelling end to justify its 
discriminatory behavior. 
Even if Oklahoma was able to show a water shortage or convince the 
court that conservation and preservation of Oklahoma water is a compelling 
end, the Oklahoma statutes would still fail the strict scrutiny test because 
they are not narrowly tailored or even necessary to protect the compelling 
end. In order to qualify as “necessary” under strict scrutiny, the means 
taken to satisfy the compelling end must be the least discriminatory 
alternative.192 If, in fact, the true purpose of the Oklahoma statutes was to 
protect Oklahoma citizens from a water shortage, the Oklahoma statutes 
would apply with equal force to all permits to appropriate Oklahoma water, 
whether the end use was in state or out of state. This type of evenhanded 
regulation would be a far less discriminatory manner to accomplish a goal 
of conservation and preservation. As currently written, however, the 
Oklahoma statutes do not survive the strict scrutiny test and, therefore, the 
burden placed on interstate commerce by the statutes make them 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. 
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V. Broad Implications of the Majority Opinion 
The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Hugo effectively provides states the 
ability to govern as they please under the protection of an interstate 
compact, without regard to constitutional limitations. Political subdivisions 
should be allowed to protect themselves against their parent states; but, by 
holding that a political subdivision lacks standing to bring suit against its 
parent state, the court has removed the only party able to hold the state 
accountable for its unconstitutional behavior. As a result, the State is 
essentially able to implement unconstitutional actions, such as excessively 
burdening the export of water, and then claim that its political subdivision 
does not have the right to challenge the state action under federal law. 
Further, due to the court’s avoidance of a decision on the merits in Hugo, 
the challenged Oklahoma statutes governing stream water remain in force 
under Oklahoma law. If these statutes continue unchanged, they will have a 
major effect on Oklahoma water law.193 First, Oklahoma water is now 
effectively divided into two classes: groundwater, which is subject to 
Commerce Clause restrictions, and stream water, which is not.194 This 
distinction means that a party can appropriate groundwater for sale across 
the state’s border, but is precluded from appropriating stream water for the 
same purpose.195 
Additionally, the continued allowance of the Oklahoma statutes to place 
a discriminatory burden on out-of-state water transfers may spark 
neighboring states, or perhaps the entire western United States, to enact 
similar discriminatory laws designed to keep each state’s stream water 
exclusively for use by its citizens.196 Unrestrained by the dormant 
Commerce Clause, many more states would likely take action in order to 
gain considerable economic advantages by hoarding their water supplies for 
in-state use. This response could significantly hinder economic and 
population growth in water-poor states, encourage inefficient use of stream 
water in states with an abundance of water, and lead to catastrophic results 
for states experiencing a severe water shortage. 
Finally, if future courts continue to disregard the “expressly stated” or 
“unmistakably clear” standard of congressional approval, virtually all 
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existing interstate water compacts would effectively authorize states to 
impose otherwise unconstitutional restrictions on the export of water 
apportioned under those compacts. A conclusion of this magnitude is 
directly inapposite to the Supreme Court’s holding in Sporhase and the 
public policy underlying it.197 
On the other hand, if the discriminatory Oklahoma statutes are rightfully 
struck down, all parties to the water export would benefit. The City of Hugo 
plans to use all of the proceeds from the sale of water for various municipal 
purposes that will favor the health, safety, and protection of its citizens.198 
The City of Irving will likewise benefit from the sale by ensuring that its 
water supply is sufficient to meet the projected water demand increase of its 
citizens over the next one hundred years in a fiscally responsible manner.199 
Furthermore, these benefits will be realized for both parties without 
adversely affecting the water supply or availability for the City of Hugo or 
the State of Oklahoma. 
VI. Conclusion 
While Oklahoma and Texas have been feuding on the college football 
gridiron for over one hundred years in the annual Red River Rivalry,200 the 
battle for water is just beginning. In addition to Hugo, the Tenth Circuit 
recently ruled that the Red River Compact insulated the Oklahoma statutes 
from a dormant Commerce Clause challenge in Tarrant Regional Water 
District v. Herrmann.201 However, the Tarrant court did not address 
whether the Oklahoma statutes would be constitutional under the dormant 
Commerce Clause if not protected by the Compact.202 The plaintiff parties 
in both Tarrant and Hugo continue to challenge these rulings in the court 
system and, alternatively, are hopeful to negotiate a water purchase 
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agreement with Oklahoma officials outside the courtroom.203 But if the 
State of Oklahoma remains unwilling to sell water across the border or the 
court system does not correct the Tenth Circuit’s errors in Hugo and 
Tarrant, municipalities in Texas will be forced to incur the extraordinary 
cost of treating water in the Red River or transporting water over 250 miles 
from the State of Louisiana in order to avoid the catastrophic consequences 
of economic and population loss.204 This conclusion would cause harm and 
missed opportunities for growth on both sides of the Red River. 
Additionally, and even more broadly, these rulings could pave the way for 
other water rich states to continue to irrationally hoard their abundance of 
water at the expense of their thirsty neighboring states that are unable to 
meet rapidly increasing demand. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to resolve the 
three-way circuit court split when it denied without comment Hugo’s 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on March 19, 2012.205 The Court’s ruling 
therefore upholds the 2-1 ruling by the Tenth Circuit to dismiss Hugo’s 
lawsuit for lack of standing. However, the Court recently granted the 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Tarrant.206 For the benefit of all parties, 
the Court should properly apply the rule in Sporhase to the Red River 
Compact and subsequently strike down the overly protectionist state water 
statutes that clearly discriminate in interstate commerce and, therefore, 
violate the Commerce Clause. 
 
Scott M. Delaney 
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